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PRODUCTIVITY AND AFFINITY IN THE
AGE OF DIGNITY
Stephen Lee*
The Age of Dignity: Preparing for the Elder Boom in a
Changing America. By Ai-jen Poo with Ariane Conrad. New York
and London: The New Press. 2015. P. 176. $25.95.
Introduction
Americans are living longer than ever before. The decline in the infant
mortality rate, a reduction in heart disease- and cancer-related deaths
among adults, and the successes of other public-health initiatives help ex-
plain our newfound national longevity.1 Traditionally, the elderly have been
cared for by family members, but the “elder boom”—and the uncertain pe-
riod of care it invites—is testing the limits of what families can do on their
own. While our lives have gotten longer, our pockets have not necessarily
gotten deeper. The strict policies on eldercare-related leave that most work-
places continue to maintain exacerbate this reality.2 The challenges posed by
the elder boom go beyond finding enough money to pay for services. Even
the wealthy among us—who can afford outside help—have reasons to worry
about securing care for their elders: labor studies project a shortage of
caregivers in future labor markets.3 All of this forces an urgent question:
Who will take care of us once we are too old to take care of ourselves? Ai-jen
Poo,4 a nationally recognized activist and 2014 MacArthur “genius grant”
recipient, takes up this question in The Age of Dignity: Preparing for the Elder
Boom in a Changing America.5
* Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. For helpful
comments and conversations, I am grateful to Kerry Abrams, Alan Hyde, and Hiroshi
Motomura. Alisha Ansari and Kristen Burzynski provided excellent research assistance.
Sommer Engels, Will Martin, Jenny Stone, and the rest of the Michigan Law Review staff
improved the piece immeasurably. Please direct comments and questions to slee@law.uci.edu.
1. See Jiaquan Xu et al., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., NCHS Data Brief
No. 168, Mortality in the United States, 2012 (2014), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
databriefs/db168.pdf [http://perma.cc/SAS9-N3kW].
2. See The Council of Econ. Advisers, Exec. Office of the President of the U.S.,
Nine Facts About American Families and Work 12, 15 (2014), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/docs/nine_facts_about_family_and_work_real_final.pdf [http://
perma.cc/Z3KD-S6EF].
3. See Peggie R. Smith, Elder Care, Gender, and Work: The Work–Family Issue of the 21st
Century, 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 351, 351–52 (2004).
4. Director, National Domestic Workers Alliance.
5. The book was ghost written with Ariane Conrad.
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In tracing the consequences of the coming elder boom, Poo begins with
the observation that existing federal programs offer very little support for
those in need of home care (pp. 35–36). She notes that Americans over-
whelmingly prefer to care for their elders at home with the help of family,
but that such an arrangement is simply too costly for most families (pp. 2,
5). Programs like Medicaid provide some coverage for home-care services
but only for those at the lower end of the wage scale (pp. 36–37). Such a
policy most directly affects middle-class Americans who have no meaningful
options when it comes time to care for an elder (pp. 32–36). Meanwhile, the
difficult work of home care, domestic work, and nursing is often performed
by immigrant women, and especially unauthorized immigrant women,
which means that caregivers are often underpaid6 and lacking in basic work-
place protections.7 Caregiving takes place at home beyond the public’s view,
which makes detecting labor and employment violations virtually
impossible.
The Age of Dignity concludes with a call for a “comprehensive federal
policy of caring” that makes eldercare more affordable for those who need it
and less exploitative of those who provide it (p. 154). Poo’s vision for reform
includes a number of different interventions, ranging from expanding the
availability of tax breaks (thus alleviating some of the burden borne by mid-
dle-class families)8 to the bolstering of existing labor protections (thus en-
suring a safer and more dignified workplace for caregivers).9 The Age of
Dignity also offers support for comprehensive immigration reform that in-
cludes a path to citizenship, a reduction in deportations, and a system for
managing future flows of care workers (pp. 163–65). It is this last aspect of
the book that I focus on in this Review. Poo argues that immigration reform
should include “channels for workers to migrate legally to the United States
in the future to work as care workers” and that these channels should in-
clude anti-exploitation features like “portable status” to prevent wards and
their families from exploiting these workers (p. 164). This Review examines
Poo’s choice to lodge her vision of reform within the labor migration sys-
tem. Pushing for greater opportunities and stronger protections for labor
migrants offers intuitive appeal. After all, Poo advocates on behalf of elder-
care workers. But the intuitive choice is not an inevitable one, or even the
best one depending on one’s larger aspirations.
6. See Rhonda J. V. Montgomery et al., A Profile of Home Care Workers from the 2000
Census: How It Changes What We Know, 45 Gerontologist 593, 595 (2005); Peggie R. Smith,
Who Will Care for the Elderly?: The Future of Home Care, 61 Buff. L. Rev. 323, 328–29 (2013).
7. See Peggie R. Smith, Work Like Any Other, Work Like No Other: Establishing Decent
Work for Domestic Workers, 15 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 159 (2011).
8. For example, Poo advocates for raising the payroll tax cap, or expanding the base for
Social Security income to cover passive income, or providing a tax credit to those whose in-
comes are too high to qualify for Medicaid but too low to pay home-care costs out-of-pocket.
Pp. 156–57.
9. For example, Poo supports raising the national minimum wage and providing paid
sick days. See, e.g., pp. 161–62.
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To start with, caregiving work undermines what I call the “productivity/
affinity” binary, which undergirds our immigrant admissions system. The
vast majority of immigration rules allow individuals to migrate to the
United States either as workers or as family members, which reflects an un-
derlying policy preference for those who are “economically productive” or
those with whom current members of the national polity feel an “emotional
affinity.” But caregiving work possesses elements of both types of migrants
without neatly fitting into either category. Although many caregivers operate
within the informal economy, their work certainly counts as economically
productive work—especially considering how they enable family members
to continue earning income (usually in the formal economy). At the same
time, the nature of caregiving reflects the kind of emotional and physical
support most commonly assumed to be provided by blood-based family
members. Caregivers, then, occupy the interstitial space separating the work-
place and the home, acts of labor and acts of intimacy, and all too often, the
outer worlds of men and the inner spheres of women.
The challenges Poo describes fit within a growing body of immigration
scholarship that explicitly or implicitly questions the productivity/affinity bi-
nary.10 And in the most pointed contribution to this conversation, immigra-
tion scholars have suggested that the family-based migration system might
do better at filling labor gaps in the low-wage and unskilled market than the
employment-based system. In this Review, I briefly canvas what our family-
based and employment-based migration systems can and cannot do, as well
as what neither can do, to help manage future flows of eldercare workers.
More generally, I hope to use The Age of Dignity as an opportunity to invite
other immigration scholars to consider the membership implications of
caregiving, especially of our elders. Confronting instances in which (adult)
children care for their (elderly) parents in many ways upends visions of
caregiving memorialized in the immigration code, which largely privileges
parents caring for their children.11 As The Age of Dignity compellingly shows,
10. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, What Makes the Family Special?, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 7, 9
(2013) (considering the advantages of family-based immigration in accordance with integra-
tion, labor, and social engineering rationales); Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in
Immigration Law, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1285, 1287–88 (2012) (evaluating the benefits and conse-
quences of the federal government’s delegation of immigration-selection authority, especially
its delegation of such authority to employers and families); Alan Hyde, The Law and Economics
of Family Unification, 28 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 355, 357 (2014) (arguing that, although the United
States’ family-based approach to immigrant admission has been considered controversial, fam-
ily unification visas are economically beneficial to the United States because immigrants ad-
mitted under such a system are likely to be economically productive).
11. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1) (2012) (allowing citizens to sponsor their unmarried
sons and daughters); id. § 1153(a)(2) (allowing lawful permanent residents to sponsor their
children and unmarried sons and unmarried daughters); id. § 1153(a)(3) (allowing citizens to
sponsor their married sons and married daughters). But see id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (allowing
citizens over twenty-one years of age to sponsor their parents).
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caregiving runs in multiple directions across several generations in immi-
grant families. Uncles and aunts care for nephews and nieces, and grandpar-
ents tend to grandchildren.12 These issues are crying out for scholarly
examination.
This Review proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes The Age of Dignity.
Part II explains how this segment of immigrant workers challenges the pro-
ductivity/affinity binary that dominates immigration law’s formal migration
rules. Part III shows how this binary sets up dual migration streams, both of
which could account for future flows of care workers. As Part III shows, the
example of the eldercare industry nicely illustrates how the employment-
based and family-based migration systems simply represent two different
ways of filling labor needs. I then conclude.
I. The People Who Care for Us as We Grow Older
It is well-established that immigrants are overrepresented at the bottom
of the labor market. Nearly one-fifth of all construction, food service, and
agricultural workers were born elsewhere, but that ratio does not come close
to foreign-born representation within private households in which nearly
half of all workers are foreign-born.13 There are simply not enough domestic
workers to fill these jobs. People are living longer than ever before, which
means that a record number of people will eventually need care as they
transition out of the paid workforce into their twilight years. The “baby
boomer” generation will be at the front of this elder boom. The numbers are
startling. As Poo explains: “We know that 70 percent of individuals who are
sixty-five years of age or older need some form of long-term services and
support. With the elder boom, the total number of individuals needing
long-term care is projected to grow from 12 million to 27 million by 2050”
(p. 154).
Public benefits in the form of Medicaid cover some of the costs of
caregiving, but these benefits target low-income Americans. Eligibility is tied
to income, which means that those who are fortunate enough to climb out
of poverty must do so at the cost of surrendering their eligibility for elder-
care assistance (p. 37). Of course, none of this affects the wealthy who can
afford the costs of caregiving either at home or at a caregiving facility.14 But
the vast majority of Americans who are neither “impoverished enough” to
qualify for public benefits nor wealthy enough to pay their own way struggle
mightily. Poo recognizes that most caregiving transpires informally between
and among family members (p. 26). But the economic costs of caregiving
12. See Hyde, supra note 10, at 380–82.
13. Audrey Singer, Brookings, Immigrant Workers in the U.S. Labor Force 5
(2012), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/15%20immigrant
%20workers%20singer/0315_immigrant_workers_singer.pdf [http://perma.cc/PAV9-YTUV].
14. See p. 65 (noting that access to eldercare support “is a mark of privilege”).
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exact a particularly steep toll on those belonging to the “sandwich genera-
tion,” which Poo describes as those who are “struggling in isolation to man-
age the demands for care and attention from two generations—the one that
came before and the one that came after theirs—alongside work and every-
thing else life brings” (pp. 26–27). All of this fosters an eldercare system
separated into “two tiers of care,” neither of which, Poo explains, serves
middle-income Americans: “Medicaid for the poor, often in nursing homes,
and privately financed residential or home care for the wealthy, with wide
disparities in access and quality” (p. 154).
Poo’s lucid and detailed description of the demand side of the eldercare
industry complements the poignant and moving analysis of that industry’s
supply side—that is, of the workers attending to the emotional and physical
needs of wards and their families. The universe of caregivers is a heterogene-
ous one. By Poo’s account, registered nurses, geriatricians, certified nursing
assistants, home health aides, personal-care assistants, and home attend-
ants—among others—all populate the universe of those paid to care for the
elderly (pp. 37, 84–85). This workforce, Poo explains, is the fastest growing
workforce in the country (p. 89).
Two themes run throughout the story that Poo tells. The first has to do
with the inherent uncertainty that surrounds eldercare work. Eldercare often
goes unacknowledged within public debates about caregiving, and it is cer-
tainly less acknowledged than the caregiving of children (p. 54). Whereas
children reflect a parent’s hopes, dreams, and ambitions, the elderly—a par-
ent’s parent—signify a life of past glory and inevitable defeat. Moreover,
people rarely know exactly when an elder’s caregiving needs will actually
materialize. A child’s progression toward independence follows a regimented
and predictable set of markers: preschool (sometimes), kindergarten, ele-
mentary, middle, and high school, and perhaps college (at least for the privi-
leged among us). These milestones not only create widely shared moments
of self-reflection, celebration, and growth—they also provide a clear set of
goals for financial planning purposes. In other words, they provide start and
stop dates for the economic dimension of caregiving. By contrast, an elder’s
decline toward dependence rarely provides similar certainty. Indeed, it pro-
vides little certainty beyond the vague notion that care will be required
sometime later in life. Sudden events of misfortune—strokes, heart attacks,
accidents, and the like—can create huge caregiving needs and their concom-
itant steep costs (p. 54). All of this makes planning for eldercare emotionally
draining and financially difficult.
Poo articulates a second theme in terms of respect, or rather, the inabil-
ity or refusal of society to recognize eldercare work as work. The Age of
Dignity is filled with voices of those workers who encounter this demeaning
attitude on a daily basis (p. 72). Poo’s account of the elder-caregiving indus-
try reaffirms an important observation that feminist legal scholars have long
championed: domestic work and caregiving are economically productive
forms of work. As Professor Smith observes:
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Similar to child care, elder care bears the mark of a social order that con-
tinues to privilege the ideology of separate spheres. A strong assumption
endures that women are better equipped than men to attend to the private
realm of family life and associated caregiving responsibilities, irrespective
of women’s status as waged workers. Caregiving, be it in the form of elder
care or child care, is deemed the special province of women.15
In line with this view, Poo points out that more than 44 million individ-
uals are providing unpaid care to family members, which would cost about
$375 billion a year if they were paid (pp. 58–59), thus confirming that this
subordinating view continues to shape the lives and livelihoods of our na-
tion’s elder caregivers.
In describing the caregiving industry, Poo highlights how the structure
of the employment relationship can impact working conditions. Traditional
labor and employment protections apply to formal employer-worker rela-
tionships. In many cases, however, the caregiving employment relationship
is an informal one—at least for those in the middle class.16 The informality
describes both the process by which workers are recruited and hired as well
as the training that workers may have received prior to entering that em-
ployment relationship (pp. 85–86). The result of these relationships forged
within the “gray market” is confusion and fuzziness surrounding the terms
and conditions of employment (p. 86). As Poo observes, “many individual
employers don’t consider themselves formal employers at all—they just
think of themselves as paying for ‘a little help’ ” (p. 86).
In other instances, caregivers obtain caregiving-work opportunities
through an agency that brokers the hiring process (p. 85). In these instances,
the caregiving agency acts as the “employer” for labor and employment pur-
poses, while the elderly and their families function as consumers (p. 86).
Although the formal nature of these caregiving relationships brings workers
out of the gray market, other market realities keep caregivers marginalized
(pp. 86–87). Poo points out that more than 40 percent of direct-care provid-
ers work less than full-time, which means they often have to juggle many
different clients (and therefore different care needs and schedules) to piece
together full-time income (p. 87). In still other instances, the government
serves as the broker (p. 87). While the ward or ward’s family may set the
terms of care, some states have care policies in which the state bears the
financial responsibility over the workers’ salaries.17 But whether eldercare
workers are hired directly by families or by third-party enterprises, Poo
unambiguously asserts that “in the intimate space in which caregivers work,
15. Smith, supra note 3, at 362–63; see also Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Economic
Citizenship, 10 Soc. Pol. 157 (2003); Noah D. Zatz, Supporting Workers by Accounting for Care,
5 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 45, 58–59 (2011) (explaining the way in which the economy over-
looks the productivity of home-care workers).
16. See pp. 85–86.
17. This is precisely the arrangement that some states offer under their Medicaid policies.
See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2624 (2014).
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the ‘us versus them’ model no longer serves” (p. 115). Families and workers,
she insists, need new tools to reshape the terrain of the industry.
II. Productivity and Affinity in Immigration Law
The Age of Dignity shines a particularly bright light on the outsized role
that immigrants play in the eldercare workforce. As Poo notes early in the
book, the caregiving workforce is the fastest growing segment of the national
workforce, which underlies an important policy challenge: finding enough
workers to fill this labor-market gap (pp. 3–4). And this is why so much of
the book paints a portrait of immigrants standing at the ready. As baby
boomers retire and leave behind 82 million jobs, Poo suggests that 35–40
percent of those jobs will probably have to be filled by immigrants and their
sons and daughters (pp. 93–94). All of this leads to Poo’s conclusion that
our immigration system should be reformed, and not just by creating a
pathway to citizenship for those who are already here without authorization.
A key part of that reform includes managing future flows of migrant work-
ers.18 Poo explains:
Such channels, if they are created, must include portable status, so workers
are not bound by their status to one employer, creating a modern-day slav-
ery-like relationship. Learning from past guest-worker programs that have
undercut wages and hurt the quality of jobs in an industry, we must ensure
that jobs created through a work-visa program for caregivers are jobs that
pay a living wage with equal worker protections. (p. 164)
Embedded within this vision is a key assumption: the only legal tools
available to identify and protect future care workers are those that currently
govern the modern employment-based immigration system. I agree with
Poo’s larger point, namely that immigration reform can help meaningfully
alleviate labor shortages within the eldercare industry only if such reform
includes greater and better migration opportunities for future care workers.
But I want to broaden the parameters of the discussion she hopes to gener-
ate. Laws governing labor migration represent only one set of reform tools
to consider.
The vast majority of formal migration flows through two streams: labor
migration and family-based migration. These two migration streams, in
turn, are organized around two principles: economic productivity and affin-
ity with current members. Caregivers do not easily fit into either category,
which helps explain the significant number of workers whose journey into
the eldercare industry required paying someone to help them cross over a
border or involved entering to tour but staying to work.
18. In addition to the opportunity for unauthorized care workers to regularize their sta-
tus, and for existing migrant workers to have access to expanded visa opportunities, Poo also
endorses reallocating enforcement resources “away from excessive immigration law enforce-
ment strategies” which have created a “human rights crisis” within immigrant communities.
P. 164.
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Under current labor migration rules, employers are empowered to
sponsor a wide range of foreign-born workers. These noncitizens are sorted
into various skills categories, and the admissions system values them for the
benefits these skills offer our economy. Usually, this means filling labor
gaps;19 sometimes, this means the jobs and other economic benefits these
noncitizens create through their consumption of goods and services.20 Mi-
grants whose basis for membership is economic productivity can almost
never self-petition.21 Therefore, labor migrants almost always must rely on
employers to file petitions on their behalf as sponsors. To curb the possibility
of employers abusing the visa system—by seeking out foreign-born workers
as a way of diluting the labor pool and thereby undermining the bargaining
position of citizens and other authorized workers—Congress has imposed
caps on the number of visas that can be allocated in any given year.22 But
nearly all of the types of migrants who can benefit under these rules share
one characteristic: they possess a skill set that directly bolsters the economy
through work or investment. And perhaps more importantly, most of these
visas are for jobs that do not easily serve wards and their families who are in
need of eldercare services at home.
A second migration stream is organized around familial relationships.
Indeed, the vast majority of permanent-resident visas are allocated to family
members of citizens and lawful permanent residents—that is, to family
members of current members of the national community. I call these “affin-
ity migrants.” Unlike the labor-migration regime, which focuses on a mi-
grant’s skill set, our family-based migration system examines whether a
candidate for admission evinces an emotional closeness, or affinity, with
current members. Within this system, the most favored categories of affinity
are “immediate relatives”: citizen spouses can sponsor their noncitizen
spouses, citizen parents can sponsor their (relatively young) noncitizen chil-
dren, and (relatively old) individual citizens can sponsor their noncitizen
parents.23 So favored are these forms of affinity that Congress imposed no
cap on the number of migrants that could be admitted into the United States
through these channels.24 Beyond the immediate-relative category, different
versions of this same basic, nuclear family-focused arrangement allow for
migration flows, though they operate with some cap restrictions.25
19. Immigration and Nationalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)–(3) (2012).
20. Id. § 1153(b)(5).
21. One category of migrant that is allowed to self-petition is investors. See id.
§ 1153(b)(5)(A) (making visas available to those “engaging in a new commercial enterprise”).
Although the economic contribution made by investors differs from that of workers—they
bring capital, not labor—an investor migrant’s value is measured in significant part on the
basis of work benefits. See id. § 1153(b)(5)(A)(ii) (requiring the migrant’s investment to “ben-
efit the United States economy and create full-time employment for not fewer than 10 United
States citizens or [other authorized workers]”).
22. See id. § 1151(d).
23. See id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
24. Id.
25. See id. §§ 1151(c), 1153(a).
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The productivity/affinity binary helps clarify why so many immigrants
work within the caregiving industry without authorization and without a
meaningful opportunity to regularize their status anytime in the foreseeable
future. Consider first the categories for labor migration. The majority of
those categories focus on skilled workers.26 These are the jobs that typically
require some degree of formal education and training. They also reflect
norms that define workplaces in the public sphere and within the formal
economy. Some parts of the caregiving workforce might qualify for such
visas. A prime example is foreign-born nurses. Because the Department of
Labor—the agency that regulates the impact of migration on the working
conditions of citizens and other authorized workers—has determined that
nurses are perpetually in demand, foreign-born nurses can often be “fast
tracked” toward a green card and into the caregiving market.27 But nurses
typically work out of hospitals, which limits their ability to fill the caregiving
labor gaps in eldercare centers or at a client’s home. Beyond nurses, most
caregivers operating within the home-healthcare industry would qualify for
visas as workers “performing unskilled labor,” which is a subset of a
broader, catchall “other workers” category.28 But this category expressly caps
the number of visas available for “other workers” at 10,000 per year.29
At the formal level, these migration rules create independent pathways
toward admission, which puts some pressure on applicants to figure out
fairly early on in the admissions process whether they want to join the na-
tion’s labor pool or its familial-relative pool. In other words, these rules
incentivize potential migrants either to highlight their work history, skill set,
and education, or the depths of their emotional ties, the commingled nature
of their assets, and their willingness to care for their (citizen) loved ones
through thick and thin within these legal categories. Compared to other sys-
tems, these categories can appear rigid and reductionist. A points-based sys-
tem, for example, governs Canada’s high-skilled worker immigration policy
in which applicants for admission can demonstrate that they possess a num-
ber of criteria that in the aggregate lead to a designated point total.30 The
criteria include traits like “education” and “work experience”—traits that
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)–(3).
27. Ordinarily, workers have to submit to a labor-certification process to ensure that a
foreign-born worker does not displace a U.S. worker, but the Department of Labor has cate-
gorically exempted foreign-born nurses from this requirement. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 656.5,
.15(c)(2) (2014).
28. This category is called “[s]killed workers, professionals, and other workers.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(b)(3). “Other workers” are defined as those “who are capable . . . of performing un-
skilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not availa-
ble in the United States.” Id. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(iii).
29. See id. § 1153(b)(3)(B) (imposing a 10,000 annual cap); see also Kerry Abrams, Be-
coming a Citizen: Marriage, Immigration, and Assimilation, in Gender Equality 39, 46 (Linda
C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009).
30. For a helpful overview of the Canadian system, see Ayelet Shachar, The Race for
Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 148,
171–76 (2006).
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track the U.S. labor migration system—but also include “adaptability,”
which accounts for whether a potential migrant is traveling with a spouse or
has relatives already living in Canada.31 In contrast to the “all-or-nothing”
approach to migration in the United States, the Canadian system rewards
migrants for possessing some traits that track economic productivity and
some that track affinity, which in the aggregate can establish “worthiness” of
Canadian membership. This design choice recognizes the reality that indi-
viduals arrive at our shores as fathers and laborers; they cross borders as
sisters and workers. Or to paraphrase Professor Motomura, while we may
ask for workers, in reality we often get families.32
Despite the formal rigidity of the U.S. admissions system, the separate
migration streams do interact and allow migrants to obtain a broader set of
benefits that go beyond the traits for which they were selected once they
become insiders. Most notably, migrants who enter or adjust their status as
“immediate relatives”—that is, as the spouses, young children, or parents of
a citizen—can obtain lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, which imme-
diately confers on them the right to work.33 And those who obtain LPR
status as workers—that is, those who were sponsored by an employer—have
access to benefits that enable them to remain close to their family members.
Any spouse or child that the beneficiary has at the time the visa is issued also
obtains the visa on equal terms as a derivative beneficiary.34 Labor migrants
also have the privilege of sponsoring their foreign-born spouses and chil-
dren.35 And of course, any temporary-visa holder can obtain a green card
through marriage so long as that noncitizen effectuated a proper entry into
the United States.36 Ultimately, then, while the immigration code unmistak-
ably prefers to admit migrants for productivity or affinity purposes, once
they are admitted, migrants enjoy a limited suite of benefits, allowing them
to stretch beyond the traits for which they were selected.
31. See Six Selection Factors – Federal Skilled Workers, Gov’t Can., http://www.cic.gc.ca/
english/immigrate/skilled/apply-factors.asp [http://perma.cc/6PRG-RDAC].
32. Hiroshi Motomura, We Asked for Workers, but Families Came: Time, Law, and the
Family in Immigration and Citizenship, 14 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 103, 103 (2006). This is a take
on Swiss writer Max Frisch’s famous observation: “[W]e asked for workers, but people came.”
Id. (citing Max Frisch, U¨berfremdung I, in Scheiz Als Heimat? 219 (1990)).
33. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (defining “immediate relatives” as “children, spouses,
and parents of a citizen of the United States”). The immigration code expressly prohibits “un-
authorized” immigrants from working in the United States. Importantly, in defining the term
“unauthorized alien,” the relevant provision excludes LPRs from that category. See id.
§ 1324a(h)(3).
34. Id. § 1153(d). This derivative-beneficiary rule applies to those who are admitted
through family-based and diversity channels as well. Id.
35. Id. § 1153(b)(3).
36. This is a significant caveat, by the way: nearly 60 percent of all unauthorized immi-
grants entered without inspection—that is, crossed the border surreptitiously. See Sara Mur-
ray, Many Here Illegally Overstayed Their Visas—Those Who Entered Legitimately Account for
40% of the 11 Million Total, Complicating Attempts to Craft New Legislation, Wall St. J., Apr.
8, 2013, at A4.
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III. Choosing between Productivity and Affinity
Poo’s call for managing future flows of care workers would require real-
locating migration opportunities so that more visas (both permanent and
temporary) would be available for care workers as labor migrants. But an-
other solution would be to expand affinity migration opportunities. If a core
feature of the eldercare services industry is consumer uncertainty—that is,
getting by without eldercare help one day, then desperately needing it the
next—then creating a flexible and available labor pool should guide any re-
form effort. Professor Abrams observes that jobs in the highly skilled labor
market and those in the low-skilled or unskilled markets raise distinct regu-
latory challenges. Whereas highly skilled workers such as engineers or physi-
cians typically obtain semipermanent jobs, low-skilled workers often operate
in seasonal or temporary terms.37 This leads Abrams to conclude that affin-
ity migrants—all of whom obtain the authorization to work as a benefit of
their family-based visa—might represent a better pool to tap for low-skilled
and unskilled workers.38 Abrams continues: “The current immigration sys-
tem largely ignores this kind of work as an official matter; the employment-
based system, requiring a lengthy labor certification process, is ill-equipped
for a market that involves private employment by families, often part-time
or last-minute in nature.”39 In other words, to the extent our immigration
system expects new members to evince traits of economic productivity, it is
important to remember what our labor migration rules can and cannot do.
To the extent we prize worker flexibility—as wards and their families do—
an employer-based admissions system may be no better (and it may be a
great deal worse) than a family-based system for identifying workers to fill
gaps in the low-wage labor market.
Reframing family-based migration as an alternative channel for encour-
aging the migration of economically productive migrants helps reorient
ongoing discussions about which familial relationships ought to be recog-
nized within our admission system. At the very least, this reframing suggests
that legislators should not do away with the sibling category so casually, at
least if they are serious about addressing the eldercare labor gap. In 2013, for
example, the Senate passed a bill that eliminated the sibling category for
lawful permanent residence. But for citizens with children, these siblings
provide important caregiving as uncles and aunts.40 Given the flexibility of-
fered by family-based migrants, sometimes the right answer is the obvious
one, which in this case would be simply to provide an expeditious path to
citizenship. The horizontal nature of caregiving only strengthens this point.
37. Abrams, supra note 10, at 20.
38. Abrams observes: “[T]o the extent that Congress wants a labor force that is truly
flexible—both in terms of when its members work and under what conditions—family-spon-
sored immigration may provide a better mechanism for it.” Id.
39. Id. at 22.
40. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S.
744, 113th Cong. § 2212 (2013).
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As Poo observes, caregiving becomes more manageable when siblings share
the responsibility, working as a team in collaboration with professional
caregivers.41
This discussion also casts a new light on existing conceptions of “the
family” within immigration case law. More specifically, it points to a larger
set of consequences of construing existing family-based migration benefits
in an overly narrow manner. For example, in INS v. Hector, a deportable
noncitizen had “the functional equivalent of a parent-child relationship”
with her nieces, both U.S. citizens. The Supreme Court concluded that these
relationships could not form a basis to establish “extreme hardship” to a
“child,” which is what the relevant statute required to obtain equitable relief
from deportation.42 Under a conventional understanding, the harm in that
case is the denial of a benefit to a child despite having the functional
equivalent of a relationship entitling her to a green card. But the harm runs
in the other direction as well. The sponsor—that is, the “functional” par-
ent—loses out on living near someone who could care for her as she gets
older. More recently, in Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, the Supreme Court
considered the Child Status Protection Act, which addresses the problem of
children who have “aged out” of the immigration pipeline—that is, those
who were under twenty-one (and therefore eligible for a visa) at the start of
the process had a visa been available but who are over twenty-one (and
therefore ineligible for a visa at least on the original basis) by the time a visa
becomes available.43 Although the legal issue turned on a question of agency
deference within the Chevron doctrine, the court arrived at its conclusion by
construing a legislative ambiguity in favor of a strict vision of the family in
which only parent-child relationships deserved recognition within the immi-
gration code.44 While both of these cases concerned the extent to which im-
migration law could be stretched to accommodate childcare needs, they
perpetuated the larger, stodgy vision of the kind of family that could drive
future flows of migration. In doing so, they limited our sense of the kinds of
reforms that are possible in solving our eldercare needs.
For the purposes of filling labor gaps, affinity migrants may not be per-
fect substitutes for labor migrants. Skeptics might raise two concerns. One
concern with counting on affinity migration to fill labor gaps is that it ig-
nores other, less drastic alternatives—that is, alternatives like guest-worker
programs that secure workers without conferring permanent membership
benefits. Guest worker programs are designed to maintain worker flexibility
while avoiding what some perceive to be the negative externalities associated
with surplus migration flow. For this reason, many economists and mem-
bers of Congress have argued in favor of limiting the number of family-
based visas and reallocating them to the skilled-worker category within the
employment-based system. This position rests on the assumption that labor
41. See pp. 56–59, 83–84.
42. 479 U.S. 85, 87–88 (1986).
43. 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
44. Id.
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migrants are more economically productive than affinity migrants. Professor
Hyde explains why this assumption is mistaken because, among other rea-
sons, it assumes that the relevant economic unit is the individual.45 In the
context of migration, Hyde argues that the relevant economic unit is the
family. In other words, migrants (often women) who provide unpaid child-
care or assistance in small businesses enable other family members (usually
men) to obtain increased earnings.46 Thus, as a practical matter, the choice
between labor migration and family-based migration is not a choice between
productivity and affinity, but rather could plausibly be understood as a
choice between different types of economic productivity, between skilled
and unskilled workers. Increasing affinity migration opportunities would
simply reflect the choice to prioritize unskilled migration to help fill a labor
gap.
In an important sense, managing future flows by increasing affinity mi-
gration opportunities would better account for the ways in which immi-
grants learn about new employment opportunities. As has been long
documented, newcomers learn about where to go for work from their
friends and family.47 A U.S. citizen who sponsors her sister as a “sibling” will
be in many instances more inclined to point her sister to a job opportunity
than would an employer sponsoring that same sister as a “worker.” While
employers, like families, operate within a larger network of employers and
firms, they have very little incentive to provide access to that network for
fear that their workers will move on to better employment opportunities.
Put differently, having expended significant costs in sponsoring a new
worker, the petitioning employer has very little incentive to serve as a bridge
to the larger labor market—at least until that worker has been employed
long enough to justify those front-end costs.
Another concern with using affinity migration to fill labor gaps is that it
does not directly confront the systemic refusal to recognize eldercare as
work. Or as Professor Nakano Glenn observes: “Legislatures and courts have
dealt with paid care workers as though they are quasi-family members rather
than as fully autonomous workers.  And, because they have walled off the
private household as off limits to public regulation, they have taken a hands-
off approach to domestic employment, including home care.”48 If the goal of
reforming our system is to ensure that eldercare workers get respect and
recognition as workers, then Poo’s vision of reform—one grounded in a
labor migration system—makes more sense.
Recall the world that The Age of Dignity inhabits: a world of round-the-
clock support, which fits within traditional conceptions of what we expect
family members to provide (p. 84). Yet, their “in betweenness” creates con-
ditions ripe for exploitation. As a matter of law, caregivers are exempt from
45. See Hyde, supra note 10, at 369–70.
46. See id. at 378, 382.
47. See Monica Boyd, Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent
Developments and New Agendas, 23 Int’l Migration Rev. 638 (1989).
48. See Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Forced to Care 129 (2010).
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several key labor and employment protections.49 The ambiguous status of
caregivers gives employers cover to categorize and recategorize workers as
necessary to meet an employer’s needs. To formally admit an immigrant as a
spouse (probably as a wife) diminishes the work she performs and does not
directly confront the respect deficit these workers experience. Such reforms
run the risk of ignoring the value of the “emotional labor” which “expands
the workday but does not increase income.”50 In the related context of the au
pair-exchange program,51 Professor Chuang notes that the “host family”
trope and other notions of false kinship “play an important role in both
masking and preserving the power differences between employer and
employee.”52
Whether future flows are managed using a family-based or employ-
ment-based migration tool, eldercare will continue to defy easy categoriza-
tion. In the same way that our labor migration rules only incompletely
measure a migrant’s productivity, our family-based admissions system also
excludes migrants with deep emotional and affective ties with current mem-
bers. The familial relationships recognized by the immigration code as a
49. Peggie R. Smith, Home Sweet Home? Workplace Casualties of Consumer-Directed
Home Care for the Elderly, 21 Notre Dame J.L., Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 537, 545–51 (2007)
(summarizing the various labor protections home-care workers do not receive). In recent
years, the federal courts have, for the most part, continued to whittle away at labor protections
for home-care workers. In Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014), the Supreme Court con-
fronted the question whether personal assistants, who were state employees to the extent that
they were paid by the state (but hired by those in need of assistance), could be compelled to
pay an agency fee to support a union bargaining on their behalf even if they did not wish to
join the union. The Court held that compelling these workers to pay this agency fee violated
the First Amendment. Id. Relatedly, in 2013, the Department of Labor (DOL) reversed its
longstanding rule that home-care workers who were employed by third parties (such as agen-
cies) rather than directly by customers (such as those in need of eldercare) would be exempt
from minimum-wage and overtime laws. A group of trade associations representing third-
party employers affected by these new labor protections challenged the DOL’s rule. Although
the D.C. Circuit affirmed the new rule protecting home-care workers employed by third par-
ties, those workers employed directly by households continued to be exempt from those pro-
tections. See Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2015). See also Long
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007) (affirming a DOL regulation exempt-
ing “companionship services” workers from federal wage and hour protections).
50. Marı´a Ibarra, Emotional Proletarians in a Global Economy: Mexican Immigrant
Women and Elder Care Work, 31 Urb. Anthropology & Stud. Cultural Sys. & World
Econ. Dev. 317, 323 (2002); see also Marı´a de la Luz Ibarra, Mexican Immigrant Women and
the New Domestic Labor, 59 Hum. Org. 452, 454 (2000) (defining “[e]motional labor” as the
“taken-for-granted effort of managing ‘feeling to create a public observable facial and bodily
display’ that produces the proper state of mind in others”) (quoting Arlie Russell Hoch-
schild, The Managed Heart (1983)).
51. The program allows immigrants to visit the United States temporarily as part of a
“cultural exchange” program, which often includes childcare support. 22 U.S.C. § 2451
(2012); Exchange Visitor Program, 22 C.F.R. § 62.31 (2014). Although the cultural exchange
program was created in 1961, au pairs were excluded under these visas between 1961 and 1986.
See Statement of Policy Regarding Exchange Visitor Au Pair Programs, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,676
(Oct. 9, 1992) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 514).
52. Janie A. Chuang, The U.S. Au Pair Program: Labor Exploitation and the Myth of Cul-
tural Exchange, 36 Harv. J.L. & Gender 269, 311 (2013).
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proper basis for membership offer only a rough proxy for emotional inti-
macy and a commitment to mutual support. In some important ways, the
ambiguity of the expectations placed on workers enables them to ascribe
different meanings to the work. Drawing from her ethnographic work on
eldercare workers in Santa Barbara, California, Professor Ibarra offers a de-
tailed look into the lives of Mexican immigrant women, or Mexicanas, who
drive the eldercare industry in that community. She found that many work-
ers preferred working for wards and their family members within the infor-
mal market, rather than for nursing homes in the formal market, because
doing so allowed them to engage in more personalized caregiving.  Just as
nannies operate as “functional” parents,53 eldercare workers assume the role
of surrogate son, daughter, spouse, or family member charged with oversee-
ing a person’s well-being at the end of his or her life.
But more to the point, the ambivalence that both sides feel in identify-
ing unfairness and neglect can perpetuate exploitation. Although knowing
and intentional acts of exploitation exist,54 many recipients (and their family
members) view caregivers as pseudokin and as a “part of the family” (p. 90).
This emotional closeness stands in tension with a focus on hours worked
and wages paid, which is the kind of analysis labor enforcement requires
(pp. 90–91). As for the caregivers themselves, concern for their elderly cli-
ents might deter them from pushing back too forcefully against the demands
of difficult and bullying members of the client’s family. These caregivers may
wonder whether their clients will receive adequate care should they get fired
for their insubordination.55 On the client’s side, as Poo explains, the family
may always wonder whether a caregiver’s support reflects a labor of love or
the profit-maximization principle (p. 90).
The eldercare industry is inextricably tied to the lives of migrants. For-
eign-born individuals work throughout the industry, especially those who
entered or remain in the United States without authorization. And because
an unauthorized workforce enables and perpetuates exploitation, the elder-
care industry reflects an intensified version of this regulatory challenge. At
the same time, our nation’s immigration laws and systems present a poten-
tial solution. Relaxing our migration laws to provide work authorization for
more immigrants would not only empower these workers to assert their
rights as workers (thereby mitigating the harms of exploitation), it would
also help fill the labor gap by growing the pool of caregivers. In its current
iteration, our immigration system lacks both the flexibility and imagination
to help alleviate the burdens of elder caregiving, but that is not to say that it
will never be equipped to do so. Changes to our migration policy, both
minor and major, can help redirect migrant flows to help fill the labor gaps
that currently plague our eldercare system.
53. See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
Caregiving, 94 Va. L. Rev. 385, 442 (2008).
54. Id.
55. See p. 91 (noting that most caregivers do not address problems with their working
conditions because they fear being fired).
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Conclusion
In recent years, legislators intent on reforming the immigration system
have advocated for reducing the number of affinity migrant visas in the in-
terest of growing the pool of productivity migrants. This has been part of a
larger effort by some legislators to draw attention to the needs of elders.56
The clearest example of this is the Border Security, Economic Opportunity,
and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013,57 a comprehensive immigra-
tion reform bill passed by the Senate but languishing in the House. This bill
eliminates the sibling-based immigrant category, thus curtailing the stream
of affinity migrants.58 Instead, it advances a points-based system, which al-
lows those types of family relations to be one factor among many that can be
applied toward a self-petitioned admissions application.59
Historically, efforts to remake the American sponsor-driven admissions
system into a points-based system have been associated with efforts to real-
locate visas in a way that favored workers. As Hyde shows, during the early
1980s, as the nation geared up for comprehensive immigration reform,
many argued in favor of siphoning off visas from the affinity migration sys-
tem and into the labor migration system. According to these advocates,
reweighting the migration streams this way would attract to our shores those
with higher human capital and, relatedly, slow the migration of those cross-
ing our borders (especially our southern border).60 But a points-based sys-
tem merely reflects a design choice and it does not inevitably favor one type
of worker over another. Importantly, the Senate bill would allow points to
be earned through caregiving.61 Thus, depending on how that trait is
weighted, a newly designed admissions system could provide caregivers with
the opportunity to regularize their status as caregivers.
In the end, The Age of Dignity provides a great service by drawing na-
tional attention to the coming crisis that is born of fortuity. My aim in this
56. In 2012, for example, Senator Harkin introduced a resolution with the statement that
“a comprehensive approach to expanding and supporting a strong home care workforce and
making long-term services and supports affordable and accessible . . . is necessary to uphold
the right of seniors . . . to a dignified quality of life.” 158 Cong. Rec. S3087 (daily ed. May 10,
2012).
57. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S.
744, 113th Cong. (2013).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Hyde, supra note 10, at 362–63.
61. The new system would have allowed for two tiers of applicants. Those in Tier 1
would be allowed to earn points on the basis of ten different factors: “[e]ducation,”
“[e]mployment experience,” “[e]mployment related to education,” “[e]ntrepreneurship,”
“[h]igh demand occupation,” “[c]ivic involvement,” “English language,” “[s]iblings and mar-
ried sons and daughters of citizens,” “[a]ge,” and “[c]ountry of origin.” S. 744 § 2301(a)(2).
Tier 2 applicants would earn points through the application of nine factors: “[e]mployment
experience,” “[s]pecial employment criteria,” “[c]aregiver,” “[e]xceptional employment re-
cord,” “[c]ivic involvement,” “English language,” “[s]iblings and married sons and daughters
of citizens,” “[a]ge,” and “[c]ountry of origin.” Id.
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short Review has been to convince immigration scholars to redirect some of
our attention toward this public policy challenge, given that so much of the
eldercare puzzle could be solved with the reformation of our nation’s immi-
gration laws. If nothing else, I hope I have shown that the labor gap in the
eldercare market is yet one more problem that could be addressed by creat-
ing some opportunity for the 11 million unauthorized immigrants within
the United States to begin regularizing their status.62
62. See Bryan Baker & Nancy Rytina, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Estimates of
the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January
2012, at 2 (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sits/default/files/publications/ois_ill_pe_2012_2.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V776-RTG6].
